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Abstract 
 
Assessing the impacts of bank mergers on small firms requires separating borrowers with single 
versus multiple banking relationships and distinguishing the three alternatives of "staying," 
"dropping," and "switching" of relationship. Single-relationship borrowers who "switch" to another 
bank following a merger will be less harmed than those whose relationship is "dropped" and not 
replaced. Using Belgian data, we find that single-relationship borrowers of target banks are more 
likely than other borrowers to be dropped. We track post-merger performance and show that many 
dropped target-bank borrowers are harmed by the merger. Multiple-relationship borrowers are less 
harmed, as they can better hedge against relationship discontinuations. 
 
 
Key Words: Bank mergers, bank lending relationships, SME loans. 
JEL Classification:  G21, G28, G34. 
 
 
Corresponding authors: 
 
Hans Degryse, CentER, EBC, TILEC, Tilburg University, e-mail: H.Degryse@uvt.nl. 
 
Nancy Masschelein, Financial Department, National Bank of Belgium and Financial Architects, e-mail: 
nancy.masschelein@nbb.be. 
 
Janet Mitchell, Financial Department, National Bank of Belgium and CEPR, e-mail: 
janet.mitchell@nbb.be. 
 
We thank, for their comments, Allen Berger, Elena Carletti, Xiaoqiang Cheng, Astrid Dick, Steven 
Drucker, Ralf Elsas, Stijn Ferrari, Thierry Foucault, Paolo Fulghieri (the Editor), Vivek Ghosal, Reint 
Gropp, Ulrich Hege, Jan-Pieter Krahnen, Randall McFadden, Bertrand Melenberg, Steven Ongena, 
Evren Örs, Fabio Panetta, Manju Puri, Tony Saunders, Thierry Timmermans, Otto Toivanen, and two 
anonymous referees, as well as seminar participants at the Universities of Frankfurt, Granada, Köln, 
HEC-Paris, Maastricht, Tilburg, Vienna, and Wisconsin-Madison, the 41
st Chicago Bank Structure 
Conference, the 2005 DIW Berlin-JFI-Philadelphia Fed Conference on “Bank Relationships, Credit 
Extension and the Macroeconomy”, the 2005 CEPR-CFS-NBB conference on “Competition, Stability 
and Integration in European Banking”, the First ProBanker Symposium in Maastricht, the 2005 CESifo 
Applied Micro workshop, the 2004 National Bank of Belgium conference on "Efficiency and Stability in 
an Evolving Financial System", and the 2004 CEPR European Summer Symposium in Financial 
Markets. Hans Degryse is also a CESIfo fellow and holds the TILEC-AFM Chair on Financial Market 
Regulation. Send correspondence to Hans Degryse, CentER-Tilburg University, Department of 
Finance, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. Tel +31 13 4663188  ; Fax +31 13 
4662875; e-mail: H.Degryse@uvt.nl. 
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the National Bank of Belgium or those of the Institutions to which they are affiliated. 
 
   NBB WORKING PAPER - No. 179 - OCTOBER 2009 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
1.  Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 1 
2.  Banking environment and data sources ................................................................................... 4 
2.1.  Banking environment and bank-firm lending relationships ...................................................... 4 
2.2.  Data sources and summary statistics ...................................................................................... 5 
3.  Mergers and relationships: discontinuations versus drops and switches ........................... 7 
3.1.  Discontinuations  versus  continuations ..................................................................................... 7 
3.2.  Staying,  dropping  and  switching ............................................................................................ 13 
3.3.  Multiple relationships, relationship intensity at the merging banks and overlap borrowers ... 16 
4.  The impact of "dropping", "switching" and "staying" on single-relationship borrower  
  performance  ...............................................................................................................................  17 
4.1.  Dropping versus switching versus staying ............................................................................. 18 
4.2.  The impact of bank mergers on small firms: Are "merger-induced" target drops harmful? ... 19 
5.  Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 21 
References ...................................................................................................................................... 23 
Tables .............................................................................................................................................. 25 
National Bank of Belgium - Working papers series .................................................................... 35 
 
 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Do bank mergers harm small firms? Do bank mergers result in lower credit availability for small 
firms?  Although many papers have dealt with these questions, relatively few have made use of 
micro data on bank-firm lending relationships. Those that have done so have either not been able to 
provide definitive answers, or have faced data or methodological limitations that may call into 
question some of the insights established.  
  In this paper we introduce three important innovations that permit us to more accurately measure 
the impact of bank mergers on small firms. First, we distinguish between borrowers with single and 
with multiple bank lending relationships. For single-relationship borrowers it is also necessary to 
distinguish between the three alternatives of "staying," "switching," or "dropping" of bank-firm 
relationships following bank mergers. This contrasts with the two alternatives of relationship 
"continuation" or "discontinuation" that previous studies have considered.1 Second, we track firm 
performance during a three-year period following a drop, switch or stay for single-relationship 
borrowers. This allows us to measure the differing impacts of "staying", "dropping", and "switching" 
on small firms. Third, a potential concern in the analysis of the impacts of bank mergers is that target 
banks have become targets because they were failing to get rid of non-creditworthy borrowers. We 
therefore develop an econometric methodology to identify those relationship drops following a 
merger that are “merger-induced”; i.e., that would not have been predicted to drop if they were 
borrowing from a nonmerging bank. This allows us to further refine our evaluation of the impact of 
bank mergers on small firms.   
 We argue that our distinction between staying, dropping, and switching for single-relationship 
borrowers is necessary for gauging the effects of mergers on small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs), as it seems intuitive that SMEs with single bank lending relationships that discontinue the 
relationship with the merged bank but "switch" to another bank will be less harmed than similar 
firms that "drop" the relationship; i.e., that discontinue but cannot replace the lost relationship with a 
new one. The difference between dropping and switching is less important for multiple-relationship 
borrowers, as discontinuation of the relationship with the merged bank may simply indicate that the 
borrower is able to transfer its loan demand from the merged bank to another of its current lenders.  
To estimate the effects of bank mergers on SME borrowers, we use detailed data on loan 
contracts to Belgian firms. Belgium, which experienced a significant wave of bank mergers in the 
period 1997-2003 and which also has a high proportion of SMEs with single relationships, offers an 
ideal setting for conducting our analysis.2 In addition, while it has been shown that in the US new, 
small bank entrants tend to fill the vacuum created after bank mergers (see e.g. Berger et al. 2004), 
small bank entry in Europe is much less prevalent. This further suggests that studying single-
                                                 
1See e.g. Sapienza (2000) for an analysis of small firms, and Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005) for an 
analysis of publicly listed firms. 
2 The only other country for which firm-level data has been used to directly analyze the effects of bank mergers 
on SME borrowers is Italy. See Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007); Chionsini, Foglia and Marullo-Reedtz 
(2004) ; Sapienza (2002) ; and Panetta, Schivardi and Shum (2009). Papers that have considered the impact of 
bank mergers on firms in other countries are e.g. Berger et al. (1998), Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999), 
Berger et al. (2004), Drucker (2005), Erel (2009), Focarelli, Panetta and Saleo (2002), Scott and Dunkelberg 
(2003), and Strahan and Weston (1998). 2 
 
relationship firms’ behavior is important for understanding the consequences of bank mergers on 
small firms.  
Yet, distinguishing between single and multiple-relationship borrowers and drops versus 
switches is not sufficient for accurately measuring the impacts of mergers on SMEs. For example, 
we find that the single-relationship borrowers of the target bank in a merger are more likely to 
experience a drop of their relationship than are similar single-relationship borrowers of the acquiring 
bank or of nonmerging banks. This finding, however, does not prove that the borrowers dropped 
from the target bank suffer more than borrowers who switch from the bank or who stay on with the 
bank, nor does it demonstrate that the drops of borrowers from the target bank are socially 
inefficient. The drops may actually be related to adverse selection, in two potentially different ways. 
First, the single-relationship borrowers that drop their relationship with the merged bank may simply 
be firms which value bank debt less than the firms that do not drop; they may prefer to rely on other 
sources of finance following the merger. A second possibility is that the dropped target bank 
borrowers are actually non-creditworthy and should have been dropped earlier.  Indeed, one of the 
motives for a merger may be that the target bank was lending to non-creditworthy borrowers and that 
the merger accomplishes a "cleansing" of the target bank's balance sheet. We need to rule out each of 
these possibilities in order to conclude that the borrowers of target banks are harmed by the merger.   
In order to address the first possibility we track firm performance for three years following a 
drop, switch, or stay of single-relationship borrowers, and we compare the performance of the target-
bank droppers following a merger with those that stay with or switch from the target bank. We 
perform a similar comparison for borrowers of acquiring banks and of nonmerging banks. We find 
that "droppers" from each type of bank are much more likely to enter bankruptcy than are the 
"switchers" or "stayers". In addition, in each group the median dropper that does not file for 
bankruptcy has a more negative change in its ratio of debt to assets, lower growth in total assets, and 
a more negative change in profitability than does the median stayer or switcher. These results 
suggest that droppers indeed fare worse than stayers or switchers. The borrowers that are dropped 
from the target bank following the merger do not appear to be dropping voluntarily or to value bank 
debt less than other firms.   
In order to test the hypothesis of target bank cleansing, we compare the performance of the 
borrowers dropped from target banks with those dropped from acquiring or nonmerging banks. If the 
hypothesis of merger-related balance sheet cleansing is correct, the borrowers dropped from target 
banks should perform no better ņ and perhaps worse ņ in the three years following the drop than the 
borrowers dropped from other banks. We also refine the test by decomposing target droppers into 
two groups: "merger-induced" target droppers and "other" target droppers, where the firms in the 
former group would not have been predicted to drop in the absence of their affiliation with the target 
bank. We find that as a group, target bank droppers perform better on all of our measures than the 
droppers of other banks. In the refined test, we observe that the "other target droppers" exhibit 
similar performance as the nonmerging bank droppers, but the performance of the "merger-induced 
target droppers" is significantly better than for droppers from nonmerging or acquiring banks. These 
results allow us to conclude that at least some of the firms that are dropped from target banks 
following the merger, in particular those firms whose observable characteristics would not have 
implied a high probability of a drop, appear to have been harmed by the merger.  3 
 
Our results suggest that previous authors may not have fully captured the impact on SMEs of 
merger-related relationship terminations. For example, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007), which 
is the only other paper to have evaluated borrower performance following bank mergers, employs 
Italian credit register data and finds that relationship termination after bank mergers has only a very 
limited negative effect on credit availability in the short run, and no effect in the longer run.  These 
authors do not find stronger impacts of termination on firms that are small or on firms that have 
relationships with fewer banks.  
We argue that the analysis in Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007) is potentially incomplete, for 
two reasons. First, the number of lending relationships in Italy is considerably higher than in many 
other countries.3 An important implication is that in Italy the shock from the termination of a lending 
relationship will be unusually small, since most firms will borrow only a small proportion of their 
total loans from a merging bank. This implies that terminations in the Italian setting are almost 
identical to switches. More importantly, the effect of termination for firms that are borrowing a 
considerable part or even all of their total loans from a merging bank ņ and therefore for which 
termination would be a significant shock ņ is not well identified. This is precisely where our paper 
comes in.    
A second aspect of the analysis of Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007) is that firms are only in 
their dataset when the firms are included in the credit register. While it is probably less of an issue 
for firms with multiple bank relationships, firms with only one relationship that face a termination 
may not always switch to another bank and may therefore disappear from the credit register dataset. 
This outcome is not taken into account, as effects of relationship terminations are measured for 
"surviving" firms only. This survivorship bias may help to explain why Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Gobbi (2007) fail to find larger merger effects for firms that are small and depend on fewer banks. 
Our tracking of firm performance includes firms that have exited the credit register dataset. Our 
results highlight the importance of including "non-surviving" firms when estimating the effects of 
bank mergers.4 
  Our analysis also introduces some innovations with respect to multiple-relationship borrowers. 
In particular, we take account of the intensity of the relationship with a given lender (measured as the 
proportion of the firm's total loans borrowed from that bank), which can reflect the degree of 
information exchange between the borrower and the lender and which is likely to be an important 
determinant of the likelihood of relationship continuation. We also distinguish borrowers with 
lending relationships with both merging banks ("overlap" borrowers) from borrowers of only one of 
the merging banks. We argue that the overlap borrowers are less likely to be negatively affected by a 
merger.   
                                                 
3 Belgium is not exceptional in having a significant proportion of firms with single bank relationships. In fact, 
many countries report relatively high percentages of small firms with single bank relationships. For example, 
statistics for France indicate that about 60% of firms having sales of less than 2.5 million € have only one bank 
lending relationship (Dietsch and Golitin-Boubakari 2002). In Portugal, about 57% of firms has a unique 
relationship (Farinha and Santos 2000). In Spain, around 50% of firms has a single bank relationship 
(Montoriol-Garriga 2006). For the US, Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000) report that 44% of small firms 
had a single bank relationship in 1988. 
4 Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005) study the impacts of bank mergers on Norwegian publicly listed firms. 
Although these firms typically have few bank relationships, they have access to public funds; therefore, the 
impact of relationship terminations would be expected to be lower than for nonlisted firms. 4 
 
  We find that, among multiple-relationship borrowers, the target bank borrowers have a higher 
discontinuation rate than do nonmerging bank borrowers, whereas the acquiring bank borrowers 
have a lower discontinuation rate than nonmerging bank borrowers.5 Overlap borrowers have the 
lowest discontinuation rates of all groups. Relationship intensity also plays a role in the effects of 
mergers. Whereas a higher relationship intensity with a bank generally translates into a lower 
discontinuation rate, borrowers with high relationship intensities with the target bank are more 
strongly affected by mergers. In addition, among overlap borrowers, discontinuation rates are higher 
for those with very high intensity with the target bank  and, by implication, low intensity with the 
acquiring bank.  
   The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the Belgian banking 
environment and discusses data sources. Section 2 presents results concerning relationship 
discontinuations, as well as drops and switches. To avoid repetition, we discuss hypotheses, 
regression specifications and results concurrently. Section 3 examines the relative performance of 
single-relationship stayers, switchers, and droppers. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Banking environment and data sources 
 
  In this section we provide information about the Belgian banking environment during the period 
covered by our analysis (1997-2003) and about our data sources.  
 
2.1. Banking environment and bank-firm lending relationships 
 
   Banks accounting for 61% of total banking assets were involved in mergers between 1997 and 
2003, and concentration in the Belgian banking sector steadily increased during this period, to a very 
high level. On the basis of data from the Belgian credit registry, the Herfindahl index increased from 
0.12 to 0.22 over the period. Similarly, the market share of the four largest banks (C4) increased 
from 58% to 88%.6 We have also computed C4 for the three size categories corresponding to the 
definitions of the Basel II framework: retail SMEs; corporate SMEs; and corporates.7 Between 1997 
and 2003 the C4 for "retail SMEs" increased from 78% to 91%; for "corporate SMEs", from 71% to 
91%; and for "corporates" from 50% to 78%. These statistics indicate that large banks were active in 
lending to SMEs prior to and following the merger wave.  
                                                 
5 Our finding that target bank borrowers have higher discontinuation rates than acquiring bank borrowers is in 
line with results reported by Sapienza (2002), Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005), and Carow, Kane and 
Narayanan (2006). 
6 Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) report the three-bank concentration ratios in different countries over the period 
1989-1996. They find that the three largest banks account for 49 percent of total assets in Belgium, 15 percent 
in the US, 24 percent in Italy, 27 percent in Germany, and 50 percent in the United Kingdom. Of course, in 
countries like the US or Italy, banks concentrate their activities in specific geographic areas, implying that 
some local markets are also highly concentrated in these countries. Nevertheless, the evidence by Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001) illustrates that the Belgian market was already quite concentrated before the starting date of 
our sample.  
7 Corporates are defined in the Basel II framework as firms with greater than 50 million € in annual sales; 
SMEs have sales below 50 million €. Retail SMEs are those SMEs for which the total exposure of any single 
banking group to the firm is less than 1 million €. 5 
 
  Belgian firms maintain relatively few bank lending relationships.8 The mean number dropped 
steadily over time from 1.3 in 1997 to 1.21 in 2003. The number increases in firm size: in 2003 the 
mean number of relationships was 1.17, 1.72 and 2.3 for retail SMEs, corporate SMEs and 
corporates respectively.9 At the end of 2003, 83 percent of the firms in the credit register had single 
bank relationships.  
 
2.2. Data sources and summary statistics 
 
We rely on three sources of data for our regression analysis: 
(1) Data from the Belgian credit register, which contains information on loans to Belgian firms 
granted by banks operating in Belgium.10 Our data cover the period 1997-2003 and contain 
both authorized and utilized volumes by bank. The banks represented in the data include all 
domestic banks and foreign banks having a subsidiary or physical branch in Belgium, which 
had either authorized or outstanding loans during the period to Belgian non-financial firms. 
Loans to Belgian firms that were extended by foreign banks that are located outside of 
Belgium are not included in the data set. The credit register contains no data on interest rates 
or collateral. Banks obtain aggregate information from the credit register about their own 
borrowers or loan applicants.    
(2) Firm balance sheets. These data come from firms' annual balance sheet filings during the 
period 1994-2006.11  
(3) Bank balance sheets. These contain annual balance sheet data, which banks are required to 
report under the Supervisory Reporting Scheme. These data are available from 1992-2003. 
   Because the credit register data include only banks operating on Belgian territory and thus 
exclude loans to Belgian firms from foreign banks operating outside of Belgium, it is possible that 
the number of bank relationships for large firms is understated. This suggests restricting our attention 
to small and medium-sized firms. In all of the analysis that follows, we have excluded all firms 
meeting the Basel II classification of "corporate" (i.e., with sales exceeding 50 million €), as well as 
all firms with assets exceeding 500 million €.  
                                                 
8 A relationship exists when firms are “currently” borrowing from a bank. This relationship measure may be 
narrower than the ones used in other, survey-based studies looking at the number of relationships in Belgium, 
where also “past” lending or other services may be taken into account (see e.g. Ongena and Smith 2000; or de 
Bodt, Lobez and Statnik 2005). 
9 Data also confirm the steady decline in the average number of lending relationships across all size categories 
of firms. For example, the average number of lending relationships for all firms in each of the years 1997-2002, 
respectively, are: 1.28; 1.26; 1.25; 1,23; 1,22. In previous work (see Degryse, Masschelein and Mitchell 2004), 
we have investigated the determinants of the number of firm-bank relationships for the years 1997 and 2002. 
The determinants were quite stable over time, suggesting that other structural changes in the financial sector 
may explain the drop in the number of relationships.  
10 Banks must report to the Belgian credit register information relating to total exposures to individual firms 
above 25,000 €.  As a point of comparison, the reporting requirement for the Italian credit register is about 
75,000 €. Around 45% of firms in our sample have total exposures < 75,000€. 
11 Small and medium-size firms in Belgium are allowed to file a short balance sheet form, which is less 
complete than the long form required for large firms. Hence, certain data such as sales and number of 
employees (for which reporting is voluntary on the short form) are not available for all firms. As a result, we 
rely on the book value of assets as a measure of firm size. 6 
 
  We construct a panel consisting of observations of firm-bank lending relationships in December 
of each of the years 1997-2003. Like Sapienza (2002), we focus on "continuing" firms  that is, 
firms that had at least one bank lending relationship at the beginning of the panel; i.e., in December, 
1997. These firms are included for every year of the panel, unless the relation is terminated, in which 
case the observation disappears. Because we are interested in observing the effects of mergers on 
firms that were borrowing from merging banks prior to the merger (and comparing them with firms 
borrowing from nonmerging banks prior to the merger), it would bias our results to include newly 
entering firms into the panel during the year of a merger.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
  Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics for the firms in our panel. This panel shows that 
the median firm has an age of about 12 years (AGEF) ; total assets of 501,000 € in 2002 € 
(ASSETF); a return on assets of about 5.4% (ROAF); and leverage – defined as the book value of 
debt over assets – of 75 % (LEVERAGE). Panel A of Table 1 also reports summary statistics for 
different groups of firm-bank relationships: firms borrowing from an acquiring bank in a merger (but 
no other bank involved in the merger); firms borrowing from a target bank in a merger (but no other 
bank involved in the merger); firms borrowing from both the acquiring and a target bank in a merger 
("overlap" borrowers). This panel indicates relatively few differences in the characteristics across 
groups. Firms borrowing from target banks are somewhat younger and have slightly higher leverage 
than other firms.  Target and acquiring bank borrowers are equally as profitable as non-merging bank 
borrowers. Overlap borrowers are older and considerably larger than other firms; however, their 
profitability and leverage are similar to the values for firms in other groups.   
  Our analysis focuses on all mergers that occurred during the 1997-2003 window. We include all 
mergers where acquirer and target are reporting to the credit registry, which amounts to eight 
mergers, all of which were "in-market" mergers. We take the date of the merger as that on which the 
merged bank began providing unified credit statistics to the credit register, which is the date of the 
legal merger. Our classification of whether a bank is an acquirer or target is based on the 
classification provided by the Belgian Banking and Finance Commission (CBFA) in their annual 
reports. By far, the three most important mergers are those related to the creation of KBC, Fortis and 
Dexia. Each of these three mergers eventually resulted in a reduction in the number of branches of 
the consolidated bank by almost one half, mainly due to geographical overlap of branches. 
Interviews with representatives of the merging banks indicated that, although no specific closure 
policy  relating to acquiring versus target bank – was pursued, it was often more likely that, due to 
the larger size of the acquiring bank: (1) the branch of the acquiring bank was kept on, as the space 
in that branch was large enough to physically accommodate the activities of the consolidated 
branches; and (2) the branch head often came from the acquiring bank, because this person had 
experience in overseeing a larger group of relationship managers. The interviewees revealed no 
explicit merger motives.   
  Panel B of Table 1 reports bank characteristics for all banks in our panel and for the acquiring 
and target banks at the time of the merger. We observe that acquiring banks, and to a lesser extent 
target banks, are larger than other banks in the sample (ASSETB). Both acquiring and target banks 
have higher returns on assets (ROAB), higher ratios of liquid assets to total assets (LIQB), and lower 
operating cost ratios than do nonmerging banks (OPCOSTB). These statistics suggest that the 7 
 
mergers we analyze were not motivated by underperformance of the target banks, an issue we will 
investigate in more detail in subsection 3.2.12 
 
3. Mergers and relationships: discontinuations versus drops and switches 
 
  In this section we investigate borrower continuations (i.e., "stays") versus discontinuations 
(Subsection 2.1), as well as stays versus drops versus switches (Subsection 2.2). Subsection 2.3 
investigates the impact of relationship intensity for multiple-relationship borrowers of merging banks 
and of overlap borrowers. We perform panel regression analysis to investigate merger effects. This 
allows us to identify "combined" effects for all mergers, to control for time effects, and to 
differentiate short-term from longer-term merger effects. 
In our empirical work, we consider single-relationship borrowers (single rel.) and multiple-
relationship borrowers (multiple rels.) separately, as well as all borrowers together (All).13 
Borrowers with multiple relationships may be better able to hedge against a negative change in 
lending policy of the merged bank by simply transferring their loan demand to their other current 
bank lenders.14 Furthermore, one might argue that if firms can anticipate that shocks to banks (for 
example bank mergers) may have more important negative effects for single-relationship borrowers, 
then "weaker" firms might choose to go for multiple banking relationships whereas "stronger" firms 
might go for single relationships. This would suggest that the choice between single and multiple 
bank relationships might be endogenous.  
At the same time, firms may want to establish multiple relationships but not be able to do so 
because they are informationally held up (see e.g. Rajan 1992). In our empirical work, we therefore 
also investigate whether the choice of single versus multiple bank relationships is endogenous. As 
reported below, we perform the Rivers-Vuong test as described in Wooldridge (2002) and find that 
we cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of the single-relationship dummy variable.   
 
3.1. Discontinuations versus continuations 
 
Regression specification. We first distinguish, as in previous literature, between firms 
discontinuing a bank lending relationship and firms continuing with their bank.  We estimate the 
following logit specification (similar to Sapienza 2002):  
                                                 
12 As is suggested by panel B of Table 1, some mergers involved two target banks, which each time had a very 
similar size. This makes it impossible to do any tests for within-merger differences in impact of differently 
sized target banks. 
13 The reader may notice that our sample splits (single relationships and multiple relationships) allow firms to 
move from one sample to another sample due to merger related effects. If a firm was borrowing from only two 
banks, both of which were involved in a merger, then the firm automatically has a single relationship after the 
merger (if its lending relationship is not severed). We control for this effect by classifying firms according to 
the number of lending relationships prior to the merger. 
14 In the context of banks facing liquidity shocks, Khwaja and Mian (2008) find that only firms with multiple 
banking relationships are able to fully compensate for the liquidity shock by borrowing from more liquid 
banks.  8 
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where each observation represents a firm-bank relationship and where ikt E DISCONTINU  equals 
one if during the twelve months following time t, the relationship between firm i and bank k was 
discontinued. Previous studies report that borrowers at target banks relative to acquiring banks are 
more likely to see their relationship negatively affected by a merger (e.g. Sapienza 2000; Karceski, 
Ongena and Smith 2005). Borrowers of target banks are more likely to see their relationship 
discontinued when: (1) prior to the merger the target bank was granting below-cost loans; or (2) the 
merged bank adopts the strategic focus and the organizational structure of the acquiring bank (Peek 
and Rosengren 1996; Houston, James and Ryngaert 2001). Also, soft information available at the 
target bank may be lost if key employees leave, or move within the merging bank (see Petersen 
2004, on soft information).  
We therefore introduce several dummy variables capturing borrowing from acquiring and target 
banks.  ikt ACQ  is a dum m y v ariable w h ich e qua ls on e i f f i rm i was borrowing at time t from 
acquiring bank k which was involved in a merger in the twelve months following time t, and if firm i 
was not borrowing from any of the other banks involved in that merger.  ikt TARG  is defined in a 
similar way.  ikt ACQTARG  is a dum m y v ariab le equ al to one i f firm i  borrowed from bank k 
involved in a merger in the following twelve months and firm i was an overlap borrower; that is, the 
firm was borrowing from, in addition to bank k, at least one of the other banks involved in that 
merger. These three variables allow us to distinguish the effects of mergers for firms borrowing from 
an acquiring bank, a target bank, or both acquiring and target banks, respectively. 
  Because all of the mergers occurred roughly in the middle of a year, using observations in 
December in each year for the panel allows us to measure the "short-term" merger effects as those 
occurring in a twelve-month period around the merger, including six months following the merger. 
That is, if a merger occurred in June, 1998, the value of  ikt ACQ  (together with DISCONTINUE) 
for t = December, 1997 indicates whether the firm was borrowing from an acquiring bank (but no 
other bank involved in the merger) and lost its relationship or not with the merged bank in the period 
which covers six months following the merger. 
  To investigate "longer-term" effects of mergers, we introduce the dummy variables 
1  ikt ACQ , 1  ikt TARG  and  1  ikt ACQTARG , which are defined similarly to the short run merger 
variables but which equal one when firm i was borrowing from the respective merging bank(s) at 
time t-1 (and when the merger occurred between time t-1 and t), respectively.15 These dummy 
variables capture the effects of mergers during the period of six to eighteen months following the 
merger, which we call from now on longer-term effects. Because the short-term dummy variables 
cover a very short period following the merger, we expect the longer-term dummy variables to 
provide a "cleaner" measure of the merger effects. The short duration of our panel, combined with 
                                                 
15 For the example of the June, 1998 merger the variable ACQikt-1 would equal one for the observation t = 
Dec., 1998 for firms that had been borrowing from the acquiring bank in Dec., 1997 and no other bank 
involved in the merger. 9 
 
the large proportion of banking assets involved in mergers, prevents us from estimating merger 
effects over a longer period.  
  We include firm and bank control variables in all regressions, as well as industry and year 
dummies. As firm controls we include measures of firm age, size, profitability, leverage, and year of 
most recent filing of balance sheet. The motivation for these control variables comes from the 
previous banking and bank merger literature (see e.g. Farinha and Santos 2002; Detragiache, Garella 
and Guiso 2000; Ongena and Smith 2000), as well as our own estimates with Belgian data. Bank 
controls include measures of size, profitability, cost efficiency, bad loans, and liquidity. For example, 
Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000) argue that bank liquidity is important for the continuation of 
firm-bank relationships. Berger et al. (2005) find that large U.S. banks tend to have shorter 
relationships. Year and industry dummies are introduced to control for business cycle effects and 
industry effects, respectively, and should also control for changes in the competitive environment 
over time. 
Empirical results. P a n e l  A  o f  T a b l e  2  p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  l o g i t  r e g r e s s i o n s  f o r  t h e 
different samples. All reported coefficients are the marginal effects on the probability of 
discontinuing the lending relationship.16  
TABLE 2 HERE 
The average discontinuation rate in our sample is 11.1 percent for the "All" sample, 10.8 percent for 
the single-relationship sample and 11.4 percent for the multiple-relationship sample.17  
We concentrate our discussion on the "All" sample, where we first treat the number of 
relationships as exogenous. Potential endogeneity of the number of relationships is dealt with in 
Panel B of Table 2.  Results for the single and multiple-relationship samples for this logit 
specification are similar. We start our discussion of the results by the firm and bank controls. This 
allows us to "benchmark" the economic relevancy of our merger effects to the economic importance 
of the firm and bank control variables. 
  Firm controls. All of the firm control variables with the exception of firm age (ln(AGEF)) are 
statistically significant, and they are also economically relevant. The discontinuation rate decreases 
with firm size (ln(ASSETF)), firm profitability (ROAF), and leverage (LEVERAGE). An increase in 
the log of firm assets by one standard deviation from its mean causes the probability of losing a 
lending relationship to decrease by 3.1 percentage points (computed as the product of the marginal 
probability and the standard deviation of the variable, and reported in the column "impact of ¨ı"). 
This result contrasts with results obtained by Sapienza (2002), who finds a positive relationship 
between firm size and discontinuation rate, but the result is in line with Karceski, Ongena and Smith 
                                                 
16 The marginal effects are calculated holding all other variables at their average values. 
17 In line with this rate, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) report a mean 
duration of the lending relationship for Belgian firms of 7.87 years. A 11.1 percent drop translates into a 
median duration of the lending relationship in between 5 to 6 years, when assuming constant duration 
dependence. For comparison, the drop rate in Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005) is 6.9 percent and only 3 
percent in Sapienza (2002). Our much higher drop rate than the rates in these two studies is explained by the 
small size of firms in our sample, due to the low threshold loan volumes for inclusion of borrowers in the credit 
register. When we restrict our sample to firms whose loan values would qualify them for inclusion in the Italian 
credit register, we have a discontinuation rate of only 5.6%. 10 
 
(2005). Smaller firms in our sample tend to have less stable relationships with their banks than do 
large firms.18    
  As expected, higher firm profitability (ROAF) reduces the discontinuation rate. An increase of 
ROAF by one standard deviation from its mean lowers the discontinuation rate by 0.7 percentage 
points. Firms with higher LEVERAGE have lower discontinuation rates; however, firms that are too 
highly levered (those with negative equity; NEGEQ=1) have higher discontinuation rates. Firms that 
have not yet filed a full-year balance sheet (YOUNG=1) and firms which have halted filing balance 
sheets (RECBALANCE=0) are also more likely to have their relationship discontinued. In sum, 
these results clearly indicate that firm variables are important in explaining discontinuation of 
lending relationships.  
  Bank controls. All bank controls are statistically significant, although not all of these variables 
are economically important. Panel A of Table 2 shows that borrowers of larger banks tend to have a 
lower discontinuation rate (ln(ASSETB)): a one standard deviation increase in bank size from its 
mean lowers the discontinuation rate by 2.3 percentage points. This result contrasts with the findings 
of Berger et al. (2005), who report that in the U.S., larger banks tend to have shorter relationships 
with borrowers than do smaller banks. How can these different findings be reconciled? Berger et al. 
(2005) interpret their findings as evidence that small banks are better able to handle soft information. 
This type of information binds a borrower to its bank over time and leads to longer relationships and 
lower discontinuation rates. Since borrowers of large banks in our sample appear to have lower rates 
of discontinuation, our evidence suggests that large banks in Belgium may also deal with soft 
information. This is consistent with our earlier observation that large Belgian banks are important in 
lending to SMEs. 
  Firms borrowing from more liquid banks (LIQB) and banks with fewer bad loans 
(BADLOANSB) exhibit lower discontinuation rates. The return on assets of banks (ROAB) has a 
(counterintuitive) positive coefficient, but its economic impact is negligible. Finally, the operating 
cost ratio of banks (OPCOSTB) appears in the different regressions with different signs and also is 
not economically relevant. 
Merger effects. We focus on the longer-term merger effects, as we believe these effects to be 
more robust measures than the short-term effects of the impacts of mergers. The observed short-term 
merger effects are nevertheless broadly consistent with the longer-term effects, with only a few 
exceptions.  Panel A of Table 2 reveals that firms borrowing from an acquiring bank (ACQt-1) have a 
lower probability (-2.2 percentage points) of losing their relationship during the six to eighteen 
months following a merger than do borrowers of nonmerging banks. In contrast, firms borrowing 
from a target bank (TARGt-1) have a higher longer-term discontinuation rate (+8.5 percentage points) 
than otherwise identical nonmerging bank borrowers. Finally, overlap borrowers (ACQTARGt-1) 
have a noticeably lower discontinuation rate (6.7 percentage points) than firms borrowing from 
nonmerging banks. These effects are considerable compared to the other explanatory variables. 
  The merger results from Panel A of Table 2 provide support for the idea that relationships are 
more likely to be discontinued for target bank borrowers than for acquiring bank borrowers, and they 
are consistent with the findings of Sapienza (2002) and Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005), who 
                                                 
18 This result reflects in part the fact that very small firms are included in the Belgian credit register. For 
example, when we restrict our sample to those firms satisfying the requirement for inclusion in the Italian credit 
register, the relationship between size and discontinuation rate becomes positive. 11 
 
report that following a merger, borrowers from target banks in Italy and Norway, respectively, are 
more likely than other borrowers to lose their relationship. However, neither of these studies finds 
the rate of termination of bank lending relationships for acquiring bank borrowers to be much 
different from the rate for borrowers of nonmerging banks. We observe lower discontinuation rates 
for borrowers of acquiring banks than for nonmerging bank borrowers, in addition to the 
heterogeneous effects between acquiring and target banks.  
  We also investigate the impact of “overlap” borrowers. We expect a lower likelihood of 
relationship discontinuation for several reasons. First, as the number of firm-bank relationships 
"mechanically" decreases with a merger, overlap borrowers have incentives to increase this number 
again (see e.g. Carletti 2004; Detragiache, Garella and Guiso 2000) on the optimal number of 
relationships). Second, by combining information from all of the merging banks, mergers may also 
improve the merged bank’s information about borrowers.19 Our results in panel A of Table 2 show 
that overlap borrowers (ACQTARG) have a lower discontinuation rate than firms borrowing from a 
single merging bank. Neither Sapienza (2002) nor Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005) treats overlap 
borrowers separately from other merging bank borrowers.  
  Relationship Intensity. The "intensity" of the relationship, CONC, as measured by the proportion 
of firm i’s utilized loans accounted for by bank k, is also likely to play a role for multiple-
relationship borrowers. We expect firms with higher relationship intensity to be less likely to 
discontinue this relationship. Panel A of Table 2 provides support for this conjecture. For the 
multiple relationship firms in our panel, the variable CONC has a mean of 0.44 and standard 
deviation equal to 0.33. (CONC is equal to 1, by definition, for single-relationship firms.) A one-
standard deviation increase in CONC above the mean causes the discontinuation rate to fall by 5.9 
percentage points. This is about twice the impact of firm size. 
  Interestingly, the "All" regression in Panel A of Table 2 also provides some evidence in support 
of our claim that single-relationship banks should be treated separately from multiple-relationship 
banks. Despite the fact that single-relationship borrowers have, by construction, a value of CONC 
equal to one, the single-relationship dummy in the "All" sample is significantly positive (the 
coefficient equals +6%). This suggests that the relationship of a single-relationship borrower with its 
bank is qualitatively different from a very highly concentrated lending relationship between a 
multiple-relationship borrower and one of its banks, at least in terms of the impact on the probability 
of discontinuation. 
Endogenous choice of number of relationships. As discussed above, it is possible that the 
number of relationships is endogenous because firms consider the costs and benefits of single versus 
multiple bank-firm relationships when choosing their number of relationships. Panel B of Table 2 
investigates this issue. The standard two-stage least squares method is not appropriate for taking 
account of the potential endogeneity, since the dependent variable "DISCONTINUE" is binary. We 
therefore implement the procedure for discrete binary variables with an endogenous explanatory 
variable as explained in Wooldridge (2002), p. 474-478 (his procedure 15.1), implementing the 
                                                 
19 Panetta, Schivardi and Shum (2009) argue that the consolidated bank should be able to better tailor interest 
rates of firms borrowing from several merging banks to the firm's riskiness, either as a result of improved 
informational abilities in distinguishing borrower quality or the pooling of information by the merging banks. 
Finally, an opposite force is that outside banks bidding for borrowers having loans with two of the merging 
banks now face an increased winner’s-curse effect, which yields the consolidated bank additional market power 
(see e.g. Hauswald and Marquez 2003; or von Thadden 2004). 12 
 
Rivers-Vuong test. Wooldridge develops this procedure for continuous endogenous explanatory 
variables but mentions that the test for exogeneity can be employed very broadly, even if the 
potentially endogenous explanatory variable is binary. This is precisely our case, since we have a 
dummy variable "Single rel dummy" which equals one when the firm maintains only one 
relationship and zero when it maintains multiple relationships. We need to turn to a probit model for 
"DISCONTINUE" as this procedure is developed for probit only. In particular, Wooldridge’s 
procedure 15.1 suggests to run in a first step an ordinary least squares regression with the single 
relationship dummy as the dependent variable and save the residuals. In a second step a probit 
"DISCONTINUE" is run on the exogenous variables, the single rel dummy, and the saved residuals 
from the first-step regression to get consistent estimates. Technically, we estimate the following 
equations  
ikt ikt ikt controls dummy rel Single 1 1 1 Q D      ,  ( b y  O L S )            ( 2 ) 
and  
    ikt ikt ikt ikt ikt v dummy rel Single controls F E DISCONTINU P H G G D          1 1 2 1 21 1 ,  (3) 
where F (.) is the standard normal distribution, leading to our probit specification.  
As controls in the probit, we employ all the variables already discussed above, except for the age 
of the firm (lnAGEF) which turned out not to be significant for the "All" sample (as was also the 
case in Sapienza (2002)). We employ age of the firm as well as the proportion of bank debt/ total 
debt (PROPBANKDEBT) as exclusion variables, i.e. they are only in the Single rel. dummy 
equation. From Ongena and Smith (2000), for example, we expect that older firms hold more 
relationships. Furthermore, firms with more bank debt would be willing to choose more relationships 
when they place more weight on having several bank-firm relationships. For the Single relationship 
dummy equation, the same firm and bank controls have been shown to be relevant. The second 
column in Panel B reveals that older (ln(AGEF) and larger (ln(ASSETF)) firms indeed maintain 
fewer relationships. Also firms borrowing from larger banks (ln(ASSETB), banks with more bad 
loans (BADLOANSB) or less liquidity (LIQB) maintain fewer relationships. The variable 
PROPBANKDEBT turns out to be insignificant. The results of our probit regression (first column of 
Panel B) have a comparable economic and statistical effect as the findings we reported with our logit 
specification. More importantly, our probit regression allows us to perform the Rivers-Vuong test. 
That is, we test the null hypothesis that the single relationship dummy is exogenous in the 
DISCONTINUE decision. We test this by adding the residual of the Single rel. equation,  1 ˆ v ,  in the 
DISCONTINUE regression and testing whether  1 ˆ v  is statistically significant or not in our probit 
specification. It turns out that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the Single rel. dummy is 
exogenous in our model, since the coefficient on  1 v  is not significant (p-value of 0.786).20 In the 
remainder of the paper, we treat the choice of the number of relationships as exogenous, and only 
focus on the results for the subsamples of single and multiple relationships. 
Firm Size and Mergers. The size-effect of lending suggests that small borrowers might be more 
affected than large borrowers by bank mergers. (see e.g. Stein 2002). Mergers increase bank size, 
and larger banks typically have a more hierarchical organization than small banks. Large banks 
                                                 
20 We also implemented the following: (1) employed PROPBANKDEBT as the only exclusion variable; (2) 
experimented with a standard Durban-Wu-Hausman test in the framework of a linear probability model; and (3) 
took the number of relationships as variable (in stead of the Single rel. dummy), but all results suggest that 
Single rel. dummy is exogenous for our purposes. 13 
 
therefore may concentrate on larger firms, and raise the cost of lending to small businesses (see e.g. 
Strahan and Weston 1998; Peek and Rosengren 1996; or Berger et al. 2005). We address this by 
interacting firm size (ln(ASSETF) with the merger variables.21 Table 3 displays the results for the 
All, single-relationship, and multiple-relationship samples. We focus our discussion on the longer-
term merger effects. For the multiple-relationship sample, the negative sign on the interaction term 
ACQt-1*ln(ASSETF) indicates that large, multiple-relationship acquiring borrowers are less likely to 
discontinue their relationships than are small acquiring borrowers. This difference does not appear to 
hold for the single-relationship acquiring borrowers. Thus, large, multiple-relationship acquiring 
borrowers benefit more from the lower discontinuation rate after a merger than do their smaller 
counterparts. This is consistent with the idea that mergers give banks a greater comparative 
advantage in lending to large firms. It is also consistent with results reported by previous studies.   
TABLE 3 HERE 
  The results for target-bank borrowers, however, paint a different picture. Whereas large, 
multiple-relationship target borrowers have lower discontinuation rates than do their smaller 
counterparts, large, single-relationship target borrowers have a higher discontinuation rate. Switching 
costs could potentially explain this divergence: large, single-relationship target borrowers may 
switch banks more often than do smaller single-relationship target borrowers.  We will test this 
conjecture using a multinomial logistic framework, an issue to which we turn in Subsection 2.2. 
 
3.2. Staying, dropping and switching 
 
   Regression specification and motivation. The impact of a relationship discontinuation hinges 
on whether discontinued borrowers can switch banks or are dropped. Karceski et al (2005) point to 
the importance of switching costs in determining the differential impacts of a merger on borrowers. 
(See also Kim, Kliger and Vale 2003 and Klemperer 1995.) Switching costs determine how 
advantageous it is for firms to switch banks versus being locked-in.22 Indeed, ceteris paribus, 
borrowers that switch following a relationship discontinuation have lower switching costs than those 
who drop, and potentially those who stay.  On the other hand, if the merged bank applies different 
post-merger interest rates to different borrowers (e.g., target borrowers face higher interest rates than 
acquiring bank borrowers), then it will not automatically be the case that switching borrowers are 
harmed less than borrowers who stay. Nevertheless, borrowers that drop will suffer the greatest 
negative impact on returns due to the merger (see our working paper version for a stylized model 
illustrating this result). 
In brief, we expect that relationship "drops" are likely to be more harmful than "switches" for 
single-relationship borrowers. This is the motivation for our second regression specification, which 
is a multinomial logistic model where the response variable  ikt Y  takes on the following values :  
                                                 
21 We have also run similar regression interacting the merger variables with firm profitability; however, we 
obtained no significant results.  
22 Firms face different kinds of switching costs. “Informational” switching costs stem from the fact that an 
inside bank possesses an informational advantage vis-à-vis outside banks. Firms willing to switch banks might 
be perceived of lower quality and therefore pay a higher loan rate. “Transactional” switching costs refer to 
higher costs that are incurred in visiting another bank. Examples of the latter are differences in geographical 
convenience, paperwork, different standards at banks etc. 14 
 
0 if firm i STAYED with (i.e., continued borrowing from) bank k in the twelve months following 
time t,  
1 if the relationship between firm i and bank k was discontinued but the firm SWITCHED to another 
bank in the twelve months following time t, and  
2 if firm i DROPPED, i.e. the relationship with bank k was discontinued and the firm did not 
substitute a new bank relationship for the discontinued one. 
 Formally, we have 
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for m = 1, 2. STAYED is thus the base case in our multinomial logit regression. 
 
  Empirical results. The results of our multinomial logit regressions are reported in Table 4. The 
coefficients (coef.) are to be interpreted as the marginal probabilities compared to the base case of a 
relationship continuation ("STAYED"). For all variables, we report again the impact of a one 
standard deviation change (impact of ¨ı) in the respective variable computed as the product of the 
marginal and the standard deviation, where for the dummies we report a change in the variable from 
zero to one. Results are reported separately for single-relationship and multiple-relationship 
borrowers.  
TABLE 4 HERE 
  We limit our discussion to the merger variables of interest, since the bank and firm control 
variables have similar signs and magnitudes as in the regressions of Table 2. As before, we focus on 
the longer-term merger effects. We are particularly interested in the results for single-relationship 
target borrowers: do those that discontinue their relationship "switch" or "drop"?   
  Our results provide a clear answer to this question: single-relationship target borrowers are much 
more likely to drop (by 9.8 percentage points in the longer run) than are otherwise similar borrowers 
of nonmerging banks. Single-relationship target borrowers, however, are only slightly more likely to 
switch than are similar borrowers of nonmerging banks; i.e., by 0.3% in the longer run.  
  The single-relationship acquiring bank borrowers exhibit very different behavior. Acquiring 
bank borrowers are less likely to drop or to switch than are nonmerging borrowers, and the 
magnitude of the difference in drops is only slightly stronger than for switches (-1.1% versus -0.6%).   
  The results of Table 4 offer some initial support for the conjecture that single-relationship target 
borrowers are more harmed by mergers than are single-relationship acquiring borrowers. Moreover, 
the impact of mergers on single-relationship target borrowers appears to be particularly strong, as 
these borrowers are much more likely to drop than to switch. Similar results hold for multiple-
relationship borrowers; however, as discussed earlier, the implication of dropping versus switching is 
much less clear than for single-relationship borrowers.  In fact, the observation from Table 2 that 
multiple-relationship target borrowers have a significantly greater likelihood of relationship 
discontinuation (be it through a drop or a switch) than do multiple-relationship acquiring borrowers 
already suggests that these target borrowers are more harmed by mergers than are the acquiring 
borrowers. 15 
 
  Finally, Table 4 indicates that overlap borrowers are considerably less likely to drop (–3.6% in 
the longer run) than are similar multiple-relationship borrowers of nonmerging banks. Overlap 
borrowers are neither more nor less likely to switch than nonmerging bank borrowers. On average, 
overlap borrowers thus appear to be the least harmed by mergers. There nevertheless remains a 
question as to whether overlap borrowers might be more inclined than other borrowers to add a new 
relationship, in order to make up for the artificial "fall" in their number of relationships due to the 
merger. We find (in unreported descriptive statistics) that overlap borrowers are somewhat more 
inclined to add a relationship: 9% of overlap borrowers add a new relationship in the 18 months 
following the merger, compared to 4% of multiple-relationship nonmerging bank borrowers.   
  Firm size and Mergers. Table 5 presents the results of the multinomial logit regression with the 
merger dummies interacted with ln(ASSETF), for the single-relationship and multiple-relationship 
samples. The results for single-relationship borrowers indeed appear to confirm our hypotheses. 
Large, single-relationship target borrowers are more likely to switch (coefficient 0.002**) and less 
likely to drop (coefficient of -0.013***) than are the small target borrowers. Hence, large, single-
relationship target borrowers appear to be less harmed by mergers than are small, single-relationship 
target borrowers. 
   For the multiple-relationship sample, large target borrowers are no more or less likely to switch 
in the longer run than are smaller target borrowers; however, the large target borrowers are 
significantly less likely to drop (coefficient of -0.022***) than are their smaller counterparts. Hence, 
as already suggested by the discontinuation results, large multiple-relationship target borrowers also 
appear to be harmed less by mergers than small borrowers. 
  With respect to borrowers of acquiring banks, large single-relationship acquiring borrowers are 
no more likely to switch than are smaller acquiring borrowers; however, large acquiring borrowers 
are less likely to drop. Similar results also hold for the multiple-relationship acquiring borrowers. 
These results indicate that large acquiring borrowers are less harmed by, or benefit more from, 
mergers than small acquiring borrowers. 
TABLE 5 HERE 
The results from Table 5 thus provide additional evidence in support of the general conjecture that 
large borrowers (of both acquiring and target banks) are less harmed by mergers than are small 
borrowers.   
  Taken together, the results from Table 5 demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between 
drops and switches for single-relationship borrowers. Drawing conclusions about the effects of 
mergers  particularly on single-relationship borrowers  solely on the basis of information about 
discontinuations can be misleading. Whereas our results based on the logit-discontinuation 
regressions could have been interpreted as suggesting (counterintuitively) that large, single-
relationship target borrowers are more harmed by mergers than are their smaller counterparts, the 
results from the multinomial logit regressions relating to drops and switches indicate just the 
opposite, that the large, single-relationship target borrowers are less harmed because the large 
borrowers are able to switch more often. For acquiring borrowers, whereas the logit-discontinuation 
regressions indicated no difference in discontinuation rates between large and small single-
relationship borrowers, the multinomial logit regressions indicate a significantly lower drop rate for 
large single-relationship borrowers.  
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3.3. Multiple relationships, relationship intensity at the merging banks and overlap borrowers 
 
  Does relationship intensity play a role in determining the magnitude of acquiring and target 
borrower effects? Table 2 shows that, in general, higher CONC lowers the discontinuation rate with 
a bank. Of interest in relation to mergers is whether multiple-relationship target borrowers with high 
CONC are less harmed by mergers than target borrowers with low CONC. Also, are acquiring bank 
borrowers with high CONC even more protected from mergers than those with low CONC? 
  In order to address these questions, we construct four dummy variables, corresponding to the 
four quartiles of the distribution of the CONC variable (labelled as CONC1, CONC2, CONC3, 
CONC4, where CONC1 represents the lowest quartile). We then interact these dummy variables 
with our merger dummies and include them in the discontinuation logit regression. Since we include 
interactions of the merger dummies with all four intervals of the CONC dummies, we exclude the 
individual merger dummies from this regression. Thus, the interaction terms capture all of the effects 
of the mergers. The results are reported in Table 6.  
  The discontinuation rate for target borrowers is significantly higher than that for nonmerging 
borrowers for all four intervals of the concentration variable (TARGCONCi, i=1,...,4), and the 
impact increases as concentration increases. (i.e., the marginal probabilities associated with target 
borrowers increase in CONC.) Thus, the effect of the merger on target borrowers appears to be 
strongest for the borrowers who would otherwise have been the most likely to stay on with the bank. 
Because of their high relationship intensity with the target bank, these borrowers may be less likely 
to be able to hedge against a negative change in credit availability by the merged bank than if their 
relationships with the target bank were less intense. 
  For acquiring borrowers the discontinuation rate is significantly lower than that for nonmerging 
borrowers for three of the four intervals of CONC and is negative and significant at the 10% level for 
the final category. No particular pattern appears in the marginal probabilities across concentration 
levels. 
TABLE 6 HERE 
  With respect to overlap borrowers, we can ask whether the relative concentration of bank 
funding with the target or acquiring bank is important in explaining the merger effect. We therefore 
run a regression only on overlap borrowers, with right-hand side variables including firm 
characteristics and the dummy variables TARGCONC2, TARGCONC3, and TARGCONC4, 
representing the overlap borrower's concentration with the target bank. The dependent variable 
equals 1 if the overlap borrower's relationship with the merged bank is discontinued.  
  The results of this regression appear in Table 7, and show that overlap borrowers with very high 
target bank concentration (TARGCONC4)  and, by definition, low acquiring bank concentration  
have a higher discontinuation rate than similar overlap borrowers with lower target-bank 
concentrations. Thus, it is not only whether a firm is an overlap borrower that appears to be 
important, but also the degree of concentration of this relationship with the target versus the 
acquiring bank. 
TABLE 7 HERE 
   In summary, our results demonstrate that borrowers of target banks are more likely to face a 
relationship discontinuation after a bank merger, and single-relationship borrowers from target banks 17 
 
are much more likely to be dropped than are nonmerging bank borrowers. This suggests that target 
borrowers are hurt by mergers, and considerably more than if they were to switch following the 
merger. In the following section we provide evidence for this claim by analyzing data on borrower 
performance in the three years following the event of staying, dropping or switching a bank-firm 
relationship. 23 
 
4 .  T h e  i m p a c t  o f  " dropping",  "switching" and "staying" on single-relationship borrower 
performance 
 
Confirming that target borrowers are hurt by mergers requires us to proceed in two steps. We 
first need to show that drops are more harmful than switches for single-relationship borrowers. In 
fact, the distinction between dropping and switching should only be important when firms' non-bank 
finance alternatives are inexistent or are more costly than bank finance. We consider a number of 
performance indicators in Section 3.1 and we find that for every indicator, droppers perform worse 
than switchers or stayers. This holds for target bank droppers, as well as for droppers from acquiring 
and nonmerging banks.  
However, while the results from Section 3.1 (combined with the higher drop rate of target 
borrowers) offer some support for the hypothesis that target borrowers are hurt by mergers, these 
results alone do not provide fully convincing evidence. It is possible that the borrowers of target 
banks who are dropped following the merger are of low credit quality and "should" have been 
dropped. In other words, the target banks may have become targets for mergers precisely because 
they were failing to get rid of non-creditworthy borrowers. Indeed, descriptive statistics for the 
borrowers dropped from the target bank suggest that the median borrower dropped from the target 
bank has higher leverage, a higher ratio of bank debt to total debt, and a lower return on assets than 
the median borrowers dropped from acquiring and nonmerging banks.    
If this is the case, the target bank dummy in our regressions from Section 2 may actually be 
picking up some unobservable (to the econometrician), negative quality attribute, such as low future 
profitability. Furthermore, to the extent that target bank borrowers are actually of low quality, the 
"extra" merger-induced drops may actually be socially desirable. We address this question in the 
                                                 
23 We have also undertaken several robustness checks. First, our definition of a lending relationship is based 
on utilized exposures, and our credit register data includes some observations where the bank reports a zero 
utilized exposure for a firm. For these observations one may question whether there is actually a "relationship" 
between the firm and the bank.  For the regressions reported above, we have excluded observations with values 
of utilized loans reported as zero, but we also have re-run our regressions with these observations included. The 
results remain very similar and are therefore not reported. Second, we have re-run the regressions by creating 
"consolidated" bank control variables for the entire 1997-2003 period (as in Focarelli, Panetta and Salleo 2002). 
In other words, we treat the pre-merging banks as if they have already merged. While some of the bank control 
variables turn insignificant, the results for our merger variables of interest remain unaffected. We have also run 
regressions with merging bank fixed effects, as well as regressions excluding bank control variables, and our 
merger results remain robust to these changes in regression specification. Third, banks and firms actually 
choose their relationship intensity, implying that CONC may be endogenous, and as such might influence the 
coefficients of the other variables. However, our results indicate that this is not an important issue, as (1) 
excluding the CONC variable does not affect the coefficients of the other variables, and (2) running regressions 
separately for firms in each concentration bucket leaves the coefficients of the other variables unaffected.  
Finally, to test our results relating to overlap borrowers, we have rerun the merger regressions including in the 
sample only firms of similar size to overlap borrowers. Our merger results continue to hold in these regressions.  18 
 
second step of our analysis, reported in Section 3.2. We first note that if the borrowers dropped from 
target banks are indeed of low quality (perhaps needing to have been dropped even prior to the 
merger), then the performance of these firms following the drop would be expected to be no better ņ 
and arguably should be worse ņ than the performance of the borrowers that were dropped from 
nonmerging banks. We test this hypothesis in Section 3.2, and we are able to reject it. Target 
borrowers as a group are more likely to survive three years out from the drop, and they perform 
significantly better than nonmerging bank droppers on our other performance indicators.  
In order to further tighten our argument, we decompose target droppers into two groups: merger-
induced target droppers and other target droppers. The latter group consists of firms whose 
observed characteristics would have led to the prediction of a drop, independently of their 
association with the target bank. The firms in the former group would not have been predicted to 
drop in the absence of their affiliation with the target bank. When we examine the performance of 
these two groups relative to firms that were dropped from nonmerging banks, we find that the "other 
target droppers" exhibit similar performance as the nonmerging bank droppers. In contrast, however, 
the performance of the "merger-induced target droppers" is significantly better than firms dropped 
from nonmerging banks. These results allow us to conclude that at least some of the firms that are 
dropped from target banks, in particular those whose observable characteristics would not have 
implied a high probability of a drop, appear to have been harmed by the merger. 
 
4.1. Dropping versus switching versus staying 
 
Table 8 reports various indicators of borrower performance after one year and three years 
following the event of staying, dropping or switching a bank-firm relationship. The indicators 
include entry into bankruptcy, growth in total assets, change in total debt, and growth in profitability 
(as measured by return on assets). For each performance measure, we report the results for the three 
categories of borrowers  i.e. stayers, switchers and droppers  where each category is further 
broken down into nonmerging bank borrowers, target bank borrowers, and acquiring bank 
borrowers. This allows us to perform a sort of "difference-in-difference" analysis by investigating 
whether dropping negatively affects firm performance compared to staying or switching. Table 8 
reveals that droppers perform worse than switchers for all performance measures, and this holds for 
all types of bank borrowers, including target droppers relative to target switchers. 
TABLE 8 HERE 
 We start our discussion by focusing on the first column in Table 8, which reports the proportion 
of firms filing for bankruptcy. A considerably higher percentage of firms enters bankruptcy after the 
bank relationship is dropped compared to switching or staying. Moreover, the effect of dropping and 
entering bankruptcy is immediate, as it already shows up after one year, and the effect is still strong 
after three years. For example, in three years (cumulative) following dropping, about 12% of the 
firms will have entered bankruptcy, compared to around 4% after switching and 3% after staying.  
Columns (2), (3) and (4) in Table 8 provide results only for firms that continue to file balance 
sheets for three years following the event of a stay, switch, or drop. For the dropping borrowers it is 
particularly important to keep in mind that these tables provide results only for those firms that have 
continued to file balance sheets following the drop. Examination of our data reveals that around 45% 19 
 
of dropping borrowers stopped filing balance sheets within three years following a drop, as 
compared with 15% or less for switchers and stayers.  
Column (2) displays the growth in assets after one year and three years for the median firm. We 
find that droppers exhibit a negative growth in assets of about -3 percent whereas stayers and 
switchers display a positive growth in assets over three years of about 4 and 14 percent respectively. 
These differences are both statistically significant and economically relevant. Target switchers 
exhibit a larger growth in assets after three years than do target stayers or droppers.  
The growth in total debt after one year and three years is shown in column (3). Whereas the 
median dropper sees a negative growth in total debt after three years of about -3%, stayers and 
switchers observe a positive growth of 4 and 15% respectively. These differences are again 
economically relevant and statistically significant. Target droppers once again perform worse than 
target stayers or switchers.  
Column (4) presents results relating to firm profitability, where profitability in year n is 
measured as profit in year n divided by assets in year 0, both in basis points (bps) and in %. 
Computing profitability in this way helps to control for the differing changes in total assets across 
the three types of borrowers. Column (4) reveals that median profitability for droppers increases 
somewhat in the first year but generally declines over the three-year period. This contrasts with the 
profitability of stayers and with switchers.  
In sum, our four performance measures indicate that droppers are more harmed than switchers or 
stayers, demonstrating that our distinction between the three options of "dropping", "staying" and 
"switching" is economically meaningful. Furthermore, target droppers are more negatively affected 
than target switchers or stayers. These results confirm that separating relationship discontinuations 
into switches and drops is crucial for understanding the impact of bank mergers on borrowers with 
single bank relationships.24 We now turn to the question of whether merging banks are only 
cleaning out the balance sheet or whether merger-induced target drops are inefficient, in that some of 
the target droppers should not have been dropped. 
 
4.2. The impact of bank mergers on small firms: Are “merger-induced” target drops harmful?  
 
  The question of whether the merger-related drops of target borrowers are efficient or not leads to 
a simple hypothesis. If merger-related drops are efficient, then we should expect to observe 
                                                 
24 In unreported exercises, we also examined the impact of mergers on credit availability for borrowers staying 
with the merged bank. Our sample consists of the continuing firms used in our previous panel regressions, but 
now excluding firms which switch banks, add or drop a relationship. We run a logit regression, where the 
dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the firm's total loan volume increases between period t and t+j, 
(with j=1, 2), and 0 otherwise. When INCREASE equals 1, we can infer that bank(s) and the firm have been 
interacting with each other, since loan volume has increased. We find that single-relationship firms borrowing 
from target banks and who stay on with the merged bank have a lower probability of experiencing an increase 
in their loan volume (1.3 percentage points in the short term below the sample average of 28% and 0.7 
percentage points in the longer term below the sample average of 32%) than do other single-relationship 
borrowers that stay on with their bank. Acquiring bank borrowers who stay on with the merged bank have a 
higher probability than nonmerging bank borrowers of experiencing an increase in their loan volumes in the 
short run following a merger and the same probability in the longer term. We have also run tobit regressions on 
firms' loan volumes, and the results are similar. 20 
 
performance of target droppers following the drop that is no better, and probably worse, than the 
performance of nonmerging droppers.  
  We undertake a first test of this hypothesis by comparing the performance of target droppers and 
other droppers in the three years following the drop. We employ regression analysis for this test, so 
that we can control for other factors that drive relationship drops. Panel A of Table 9 reports the 
results of OLS regressions for our performance indicators of growth in assets, growth in debt, and 
growth in profitability (as defined in Subsection 3.1). In addition, this table reports the results of a 
probit regression on a "survival" dummy, which equals 1 if the dropped borrower is still filing a 
balance sheet 3 years after the drop and 0 otherwise. We believe that this variable provides a sharper 
indicator of survivability than entry into bankruptcy, since firms that file for bankruptcy often first 
stop filing a balance sheet, then only later (sometimes after several years) file for bankruptcy. As we 
noted in Section 3.1, whereas around 12% of borrowers that drop file for bankruptcy within three 
years of the drop, almost 45% of droppers have stopped filing balance sheets during this period.25 
TABLE 9 HERE 
  Column (1) of Panel A in Table 9 reports the results of the probit regression on the survival 
dummy. Independent variables in this regression are the firm and bank controls at time 0, and the 
acquiring (ACQ) and target (TARG) merger dummies. While all firm characteristics are significant 
with the expected sign, for the sake of brevity we do not discuss them further. The bank 
characteristics are included as additional controls but only two of them are significant. More 
importantly, we find that target droppers (TARG) are significantly more likely to survive (7.2 
percentage points) than otherwise similar firms, whereas acquiring firm droppers (ACQ) are less 
likely to survive (5.8 percentage points).   
  Columns (2), (3) and (4) of Panel A in Table 9 presents the results of the OLS regressions on the 
other performance indicators. Control variables are again the firm and bank characteristics at time 
zero. Firm controls have the expected signs and bank controls in general are not significant.  Target 
borrowers (TARG) exhibit greater growth in assets and debt than otherwise similar borrowers and a 
similar growth in profitability. Acquiring bank borrowers (ACQ) exhibit a higher growth in 
profitability. In sum, the results of panel A in Table 9 indicate that target droppers on average 
perform better than otherwise similar droppers. 
  We now take the analysis one step further, by decomposing target droppers into merger-induced 
target droppers and other target droppers and rerunning the above regressions with these two 
groups. We construct the two groups in the following way. We first compute a predicted drop 
probability for all droppers based upon the coefficients from the drop-stay regressions for single 
relationship borrowers in Table 4. We retain all droppers with a predicted drop probability greater 
than 50%.26 We further separate the retained target droppers into the groups of merger-induced 
target droppers and other target droppers as follows. For each retained target dropper, we compute 
                                                 
25 The 45% figure includes the firms that have entered bankruptcy. 
26 We choose the 50% cutoff because we would like to compare the performance of target droppers that one 
could clearly argue "should" have been dropped on the basis of their observed characteristics with those whose 
observed characteristics would not have put them in that category. A predicted drop probability of 50% would 
appear to be a reasonable rule.   Roughly half of the acquiring and nonmerging droppers are retained with this 
rule, and almost 60% of the target droppers are retained. 21 
 
two predicted drop probabilities, again based upon the drop-stay regressions from Table 4. The first 
predicted probability is one where the target dummies equal one and the second is one where the 
target dummies are assumed equal to zero. We label “merger-induced target droppers” as those target 
droppers that have a drop probability of less than 50% when the target dummies are "turned off" 
(equal to zero) but greater than 50% with the target dummies equal to one. That is, the merger-
induced target droppers are those target droppers that would not have been predicted to drop (by our 
50% probability rule) when borrowing from a nonmerging bank, but that are predicted to drop given 
that they were borrowing from the target bank. Those droppers that are not "merger-induced" are 
classified as “other target droppers”. Over fourty percent of the retained target droppers are “merger-
induced”. 
  If "merger-induced" target droppers were observed to have better performance than nonmerging 
droppers while "other" target droppers have similar performance to nonmerging droppers, this would 
offer rather compelling evidence that the merger-induced target droppers are not being dropped for 
efficiency reasons. Rather, it would be consistent with the conjecture that the merger-induced drops 
are inefficient and that these borrowers should not have been dropped in the first place. Moreover, as 
droppers fare worse than stayers or switchers, this would be consistent with the conjecture that the 
merger-induced target droppers are harmed by the merger.  
  Panel B of Table 9 displays the results for the four performance regressions for firms retained by 
our "50% estimated drop probability rule". The target dummy from Panel A has now been replaced 
with two target dummies: “merger-induced target” and “other target”, as explained above. The 
results in Panel B reveal that the “merger-induced target” droppers exhibit better performance than 
otherwise similar firms: they are more likely to survive, and they also have higher growth in assets, 
debt and profitability. The “other target” droppers exhibit performance that is similar to that of 
nonmerging droppers. 
  On the one hand, these results would suggest that merger-induced target droppers are less hurt by 
the drop than are other target droppers. On the other hand, the merger-induced target droppers should 
not have been dropped in the first place, and they appear to have been dropped for reasons other than 
credit-worthiness. These merger-induced target droppers are hurt by the bank merger, since they fare 
worse than staying or switching borrowers. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
  In this paper we have used detailed data on firm-bank loan contracts to analyze the effects of 
bank mergers on SMEs' bank lending relationships. We have shown that in order to accurately gauge 
the heterogeneous effects of mergers on borrowers, it is necessary to treat borrowers with single 
bank relationships separately from borrowers with multiple bank relationships. For single-
relationship borrowers it is also necessary to distinguish between the three alternatives of "stay", 
"drop", and "switch", versus the two alternatives of "continue" and "discontinue" that previous 
merger studies have analyzed.  
   We find that single-relationship borrowers of target banks in a merger are more likely to face 
relationship discontinuations than other borrowers, and these discontinuations are much more likely 
to result in drops than switches. In order to determine whether the borrowers dropped from the target 
bank are hurt by the merger, we proceed in two steps. We first follow single-relationship borrowers 22 
 
for three years following a drop or switch. We find that firms that drop exhibit worse performance 
and higher bankruptcy frequency than firms that switch or that stay. This demonstrates that our 
distinction between staying, dropping and switching is economically meaningful.  
  Second, we consider the hypothesis that the greater frequency of dropped borrowers from target 
banks may correspond to a socially efficient "cleansing" of the target bank. A comparison of the 
post-merger performance of the single-relationship borrowers dropped from the target bank with 
borrowers dropped from other banks reveals that the dropped target borrowers as a group perform 
better than the dropped borrowers from other banks during the three-year period following the drop. 
We then refine our test by decomposing target droppers into two groups: "merger-induced target 
droppers" and "other target droppers", where the firms in the former group would not have been 
predicted to drop in the absence of their affiliation with the target bank. We find that whereas the 
"other target droppers" have similar performance as nonmerging bank droppers, the merger-induced 
target droppers exhibit significantly better performance than nonmerging bank droppers. These 
results allow us to reject the hypothesis that the higher frequency of drops of borrowers from the 
target bank reflects desirable balance sheet cleansing.  
  We thus conclude that single-relationship borrowers of target banks ņ at least those borrowers 
that are dropped and whose observed characteristics would not have implied a high probability of 
being dropped ņ are especially harmed by mergers.  This result is new to the literature on bank 
mergers and has important policy implications, since single-relationship borrowers who lose their 
relationship without adding a new one also lose their access to bank credit.  
  With respect to multiple-relationship borrowers, the overlap borrowers, i.e., firms borrowing 
from both the acquiring and target banks, are less harmed by mergers than are firms borrowing from 
only one of the merging banks. The intensity of the relationship also plays a significant role for 
multiple-relationship borrowers. For target bank borrowers, the relative impact of mergers on 
relationship discontinuations grows stronger as the intensity of the borrower's relationship with the 
target bank increases. Even for overlap borrowers, the intensity of the relationship with the target 
bank makes a difference: overlap borrowers with high relationship intensity with the target bank  
and, by definition, low intensity with the acquiring bank  are more likely to see their relationship 
discontinued following a merger. Thus, a strong association with the target bank overrides both the 
positive effect of relationship intensity on relationship continuation and the positive effect of being 
an overlap borrower. 
  Our findings concerning the greater harm inflicted by mergers on single-relationship than 
multiple-relationship borrowers confirm the intuition that multiple-relationship borrowers are better 
able to hedge against a fall in credit availability following a merger. These findings suggest that 
policy makers may have good reason to be concerned about the impacts of mergers on SMEs, given 
that in most countries a significant proportion of the SME population consists of single-relationship 
borrowers. 23 
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Table 3: Logit-discontinuation regressions: interaction with firm size for acquiring and 
target banks 
 
 
  Sample 
  All  Single  rel.  Multiple  rels 
       
Firm controls  yes  yes  yes 
Bank controls  yes  yes  yes 
ACQt  0.113***  0.083***  0.058* 
TARGt  -0.158***  -0.217***  -0.159*** 
ACQTARGt  -0.371**  -  -0.312** 
ACQt-1  0.073***  0.024  0.145*** 
TARGt-1  0.052**  -0.078***  0.261*** 
ACQTARGt-1  -0.354**  -  -0.395* 
ACQt * ln(ASSETF)  -0.009***  -0.006***  -0.005* 
TARGt * ln(ASSETF)  0.013***  0.019***  0.013**** 
ACQTARGt *ln(ASSETF)  0.016  -  0.011 
ACQt-1 * ln(ASSETF)  -0.007***  -0.004  -0.012*** 
TARGt-1 * ln(ASSETF)  0.003  0.012***  -0.012*** 
ACQTARGt-1*ln(ASSETF)  0.020**  -  0.022 
 
The dependent variable in each regression equals one if during the following year firm i discontinues its relationship with bank k. 
The reported coefficients are logit estimates of a marginal change in the independent variable on the probability of discontinuing 
the lending relationship. All regressions include a constant term, firm industry dummies, and year dummies (not reported). 
Definitions of the variables are in Table 1. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1%-level, respectively (based on 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors). 
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Table 5: Multinomial logit regressions: interaction with firm size for acquiring and 
target banks 
 
  Sample 
  Single rel.  Multiple rels. 
  SWITCHED 
versus STAYED 
DROPPED versus 
STAYED 
SWITCHED 
versus STAYED 
DROPPED versus 
STAYED 
Firm controls  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Bank controls  yes   yes   yes  yes 
ACQt  0.001***  0.762***  -0.026***  0.243*** 
TARGt  -0.011***  0.229***  -0.006**  0.059 
ACQTARGt  -  -  0.577***  -0.089 
ACQt-1  -0.011***  0.679***  0.002  0.278*** 
TARGt-1  -0.010***  0.534***  -0.004  0.830*** 
ACQTARGt-1  -  -  -0.006***  -0.061 
ACQt * ln(ASSETF)  -0.001**  -0.027***  0.002***  -0.018*** 
TARGt * ln(ASSETF)  0.003***  -0.009***  0.001**  -0.003 
ACQTARGt *ln(ASSETF)  -  -  -0.002**  0.005 
ACQt-1 * ln(ASSETF)  0.001  -0.025***  0.000  -0.021*** 
TARGt-1 * ln(ASSETF)  0.002**  -0.013***  0.000  -0.022*** 
ACQTARGt-1*ln(ASSETF)  -  -  0.002***  0.002 
 
This table presents the result of a multinomial logit regression where the base case is a relationship continuation 
(STAYED). The coefficients reported in this table are to be interpreted as the marginal probabilities compared to the base 
case. All regressions include a constant term, firm industry dummies, and year dummies (not reported). Definitions of the 
variables are in Table 1. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1%-level, respectively (based on 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors). 
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Table 6: Mergers and relationship intensity 
   
  Multiple rels 
   
Firm controls  yes 
Bank controls  yes 
CONC2  -0.072*** 
CONC3  -0.129*** 
CONC4  -0.147*** 
ACQt  -0.013* 
TARGt  0.016** 
ACQTARGt  -0.114*** 
ACQt-1*CONC1  -0.026*** 
ACQt-1*CONC2  -0.009* 
ACQt-1*CONC3  -0.019*** 
ACQt-1*CONC4  -0.032*** 
TARGt-1*CONC1  0.072*** 
TARGt-1*CONC2  0.082*** 
TARGt-1*CONC3  0.112*** 
TARGt-1*CONC4  0.121*** 
ACQTARGt-1  -0.055*** 
 
The dependent variable in the regression equals one if during the following year firm i discontinues its relationship with 
bank k. The reported coefficients are logit estimates of a marginal change in the independent variable on the probability 
of discontinuation of the lending relationship. All regressions include a constant term, firm industry dummies, and year 
dummies (not reported). Definitions of the variables are in Table 1. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1%-
level, respectively (based on heteroskedastic-robust standard errors). 
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Table 7: Relationship intensity with target bank for overlap borrowers 
   
  Overlap 
borrowers 
   
Ln(AGEF)  -0.004 
Ln(ASSETF)  0.002 
ROAF  0.069 
LEVERAGE  -0.005 
LEVERAGE*NEGEQ  0.024 
RECBALANCE  -0.028* 
YOUNG  0.030 
TARGt-1*CONC2  0.004 
TARGt-1*CONC3  0.014 
TARGt-1*CONC4  0.037*** 
 
The regression includes only overlap borrowers. The dependent variable in the regression equals one if during the 
following year firm i's relationship with the merged bank is discontinued. The reported coefficients are logit estimates of 
a marginal change in the independent variable on the probability of losing the lending relationship. All regressions 
include a constant term, firm industry dummies, and year dummies (not reported). The variable TARGCONCi, i=1,2,3,4 
represent the concentration buckets for the overlap borrower's concentration with the target bank Definitions of all other 
variables are in Table 1. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1%-level, respectively (based on 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors).  
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